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Abstract 
Numerous articles in the agricultural economics literature investigate the empirical relationship 
between the spot market price of fed cattle and the volume of packers’ precommitted, or “captive,” 
supplies of cattle. In this article, we use an extensive data set on the cattle procurement activities of 
four large packing plants in the Texas Panhandle from early 1995 through mid-1996 to examine this 
relationship at the plant-level. We find evidence to support the hypothesis that plants that antici-
pate near-term future deliveries of captive supply cattle that are high relative to their regional-mar-
ket rivals’ degrees of reliance on captive supplies tend to pay spot market prices that are below av-
erage. The effect, while statistically significant, is relatively small in magnitude, however. 
1. Introduction
Beef packing plants use a variety of means of procuring fed cattle for slaughter. The 
traditional method, which still accounts for the majority of fed cattle marketed, is the 
“cash” or “spot” market purchase in which a buyer inspects cattle at the feed-yard, and 
submits lot-specific price bids, usually on a live-weight basis. Cattle procured by this 
means are normally shipped to the plant within about 1 week of purchase. Other procure-
ment methods commit the cattle to the buyer for longer periods of time. These methods, 
commonly known as “captive supply” procurement methods, include marketing agree-
ments, forward contract sales, and packer-feeding of cattle. In 1999, 23.6% of steer and 
heifer slaughter by the 15 largest packers represented captive supply cattle (Grain Inspec-
tion, Packers and Stockyards Administration, 2002). The effect of captive supplies on the 
spot market for fed cattle is a topic of considerable policy debate and has been the sub-
ject of numerous articles in the agricultural economics literature and two recent investiga-
tions sponsored by the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) 
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of the USDA.1 Several of these studies involve the use of data in an effort to characterize 
the empirical relationship between captive supply usage and spot market price. What has 
sometimes been lacking in this work is explicit recognition of the fact that there actually 
are at least two kinds of captive-supply–cash-price relationships that are very different in 
their empirical manifestations, their economic causes, and their policy relevance. 
Much of the interest in captive supplies stems from the perception that their use some-
how leads to lower prices, on average, for cattle in the spot market, and therefore, is 
harmful to cash market sellers of fed cattle. The relationship that is most relevant to this 
hypothesis is the one between the volume of captive supply deliveries in a region, on the 
one hand, and the regional market’s average quality-adjusted spot price for fed cattle, 
on the other. Several authors, using a variety of data sets and empirical techniques, have 
investigated this “market-level” relationship. Generally speaking, they have found that 
fed cattle prices in a regional cash market tend to be low on average in periods in which 
the region’s captive supply delivery volume is high.2 In other work (Schroeter & Azzam, 
1999, 2002), we provide additional evidence of this empirical regularity and address its 
relevance for policy making.
Once again, the market-level relationship is concerned with the pattern of covariation, 
over time, between a regional market’s aggregate volume of captive supply deliveries and 
the average price of fed cattle in the cash market. The focus of the present article, however, 
is another kind of captive-supply–cash-price relationship: the relationship across packing 
plants, at a given point in time, between the degree of reliance on captive supply sources 
and the quality-adjusted spot market prices paid relative to the market’s current average 
price. When a plant’s use of captive supplies is high, does it tend to pay spot prices that 
are toward the low end of the market’s distribution of prices? Intuition suggests that it 
does. A packer with a relatively large share of planned slaughter volume already commit-
ted in the form of scheduled captive supply deliveries would want to supplement those 
cattle with relatively few cash market purchases. Thus, freed from the necessity of ag-
gressive bidding on the cash market, the packer should be able to make cash market pur-
chases at quality-adjusted prices that are low relative to average.3 In this article, we for-
malize that argument slightly and provide some empirical evidence to support it and to 
gauge the magnitude of the effect. 
The next section briefly reviews some of the institutional features of fed cattle markets 
that are pertinent to the analysis. Section 3 presents a simple graphical model that pre-
dicts a plant-level relationship of the kind described in the previous paragraph. In Section 
1 Papers dealing with this topic include; Azzam (1998); Elam (1992); Hayenga and O’Brien (1992); Love and Bur-
ton (1999); Schroeder, Jones, Mintert, and Barkley (1993); Schroeter and Azzam (2002); Ward, Koontz, and 
Schroeder (1998); Ward, Koontz, Dowty, Trapp, & Peel (1999); and Zhang and Sexton (2000). The two GIPSA-
sponsored studies are reported in Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1996); and Schroeter and Azzam (1999). 
Widespread interest in the topic prompted the USDA to sponsor a Public Forum on Captive Supplies in the 
Livestock Industry in Denver, CO, on September 21, 2000. 
2 Empirical investigations finding at least some evidence of an inverse relationship between captive deliver-
ies and cash prices at the market level include Elam (1992), Hayenga and O’Brien (1992), and Schroeder et al. 
(1993). 
3 Both Ward et al. (1998) and Schroeder et al. (1993) report the results of regressions that are pertinent to the 
plant-level relationship insofar as they explain the price paid for a lot of spot market cattle in terms of some 
measure of captive supply usage by the purchasing plant. Schroeter and Azzam (1999) also carry out an em-
pirical investigation of the plant-level relationship. This article presents a revised version of the analysis un-
dertaken in section VIII.2 of that report. 
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4, the hypothesis is tested empirically. Section 5 interprets the results and discusses their 
relevance to the captive supply policy debate. Briefly, although our investigation uncov-
ers an inverse relationship in one specific type of captive-supply–cash-price comparison, 
we argue that it should not be used as a justification for policies designed to restrict the 
use of captive supplies. A concluding Section 6 provides a summary. 
2. Institutional Considerations 
As part of a recent investigation of the effects of captive supplies, GIPSA collected 
data on the cattle procurement activities of four large beef-packing plants in the Texas 
Panhandle over the period from early February 1995 through mid-May 1996. Additional 
detail about the information collected in the GIPSA investigation is provided in Schroeter 
and Azzam (1999). The inquiry solicited information on every lot of cattle, of over 35 
head, purchased by the four plants during the period of study. The investigation also con-
ducted interviews with feedyard managers and packing company personnel about vari-
ous aspects of cattle markets. The records of the plants’ cattle procurement activities are 
the source of the data used in this article and some of the features of the market that were 
revealed in interviews are reflected in our modeling assumptions. 
Captive supply procurement methods include marketing agreements, forward con-
tract sales, and packer-feeding of cattle. Marketing agreements are formal or informal 
standing arrangements between a packer and a feeder for the delivery of cattle on an on-
going basis. These agreements include the stipulation that the cattle will be priced accord-
ing to a formula consisting of a base price, that is tied to current spot market prices, and 
a system of premia and discounts used to adjust the base price for variation in the quality 
of delivered cattle. Unlike marketing agreements, forward contract sales involve explicit 
contracts for delivery of a specified number of cattle in a particular future month. Most 
of these take the form of basis forward contracts in which the buyer bids a futures mar-
ket basis for the delivery month. “Packer-fed” cattle are owned by the packer during the 
feeding process, which usually takes place in independently owned feedlots with which 
the packer has contracted for feeding services. 
In the case of marketing agreement cattle, the feeder determines the number of cattle to 
be delivered to a plant under a given marketing agreement within a given week. More im-
portantly for our analysis, GIPSA interview reports suggest that the delivery volume for a 
particular week is normally determined and reported to the packer 2 weeks in advance.4 
The terms of conventional forward contracts reserve for the buyer the right to spec-
ify the day of delivery within the delivery month. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, 
that delivery timing is usually a mutual decision between the buyer and the feedlot, with 
an effort made to deliver cattle when their optimal potential is reached. Once the decision 
to deliver is made, there can be a time lag attributable to delays in arranging for transpor-
tation. The data from the Texas Panhandle investigation suggest that the number of for-
4 In making the judgment that the volume of marketing agreement deliveries is normally determined 2 weeks in 
advance of delivery, we are relying on our interpretation of the interview reports summarized in Appendix B 
of Schroeter and Azzam (1999). The transaction data from the Texas Panhandle investigation do not contain 
information about the date on which the feeder notified the packer of the number of cattle to be delivered dur-
ing a given week. 
492 schroeter & azzam in agribusiness  19 (2003) 
ward contract cattle to be delivered in a given week is normally decided 1 to 2 weeks in 
advance.5 
Packer-fed cattle made a relatively insignificant contribution to total slaughter num-
bers for the four Texas plants during the period of investigation.6 Obviously, the packer 
has complete discretion over when to utilize packer-owned supplies of cattle. As with 
other captive supply sources, however, delays in arranging transportation mean that a 
week’s delivery volume of packer-fed cattle would normally be determined at least a few 
days in advance. 
3. The Plant-Level Behavioral Model
For our purposes, the main implication of the institutional details reviewed in the pre-
vious section is that a packer, upon entering the spot market with the intention of pur-
chasing cattle for slaughter over a given period of time; a given week, say; typically 
knows the volume of captive supply deliveries already scheduled for that week. For any 
given packer, moreover, this volume of precommitted supplies tends to vary from week 
to week. The following graphical model shows how the packer’s spot market cattle pur-
chases and average spot market price is likely to vary in response to week-to-week fluctu-
ations in the volume of captive supply deliveries. 
Figure 1 depicts the residual supply curve of spot market cattle facing an individual 
packer. Labeled AACS, for average acquisition cost of spot market cattle, this curve repre-
sents the regional spot market’s overall supply net of spot cattle demands by other packers 
in the region. Defined in this way, the residual supply curve consists of the locus of price–
quantity combinations available to the packer in its spot market dealings for the time period 
under consideration. The fact that the curve slopes upward reflects our assumption that the 
packer is not a price-taker in its regional spot cattle market: The price it must pay is not in-
dependent of the number of spot cattle it purchases. For given market conditions, purchas-
Figure 1. Average and Marginal Acquisition Cost of Spot Market Cattle
5 For forward contract lots, the GIPSA data usually contain the “scheduling date,” the date on which the lot’s 
delivery date is fixed by the packer. For these lots, the distribution of the number of days from the scheduling 
date until the kill date has a mean of 11.88 days and a standard deviation of 7.98 days. 
6 For the study’s four packing plants during the period of investigation, the percentages of steer and heifer 
slaughter attributable to each procurement method were as follows: spot market, 71.3%; packer-fed, 2.5%; for-
ward contract, 5.2%; marketing agreement, 21.0%. 
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ing a greater number of cattle requires that the packer bid more aggressively causing the 
average spot cattle acquisition cost to rise, at least slightly.7 Of course, the position of the 
packer’s residual supply curve can shift with shifts in regional supply or with changes in ri-
val packers’ spot marketing conduct for the period. Because residual supply, representing 
average cattle acquisition cost, is upward sloping, marginal cattle acquisition cost, also de-
picted in Figure 1 and labeled MACS , lies everywhere above it. 
Figure 2 depicts the packer’s marginal slaughter/processing cost for cattle, labeled 
MPC, and drawn so as to indicate an approximately constant marginal processing cost 
out to plant “capacity” at which point marginal cost rises sharply. Figure 3 depicts the 
output demand curve, or average revenue curve (labeled AR), that the packer faces. As 
drawn here, with a slight downward slope, the packer is assumed to possess some in-
fluence over price in the output market as well: if the packer were to sell more output, it 
would drive the price down slightly. If, instead, the packer’s output price were indepen-
dent of its sales, demand would be horizontal. Marginal revenue, denoted MR in Figure 
3, lies everywhere below demand.8
Now consider a packer with a given volume of captive supply deliveries already com-
mitted for the decision period. The acquisition cost of these cattle is sunk and so will not 
affect the packer’s spot market purchase decision.9 The packer’s relevant marginal cost 
curve, therefore, is MPC alone, out to the precommitted captive supply delivery volume, 
Figure 2 Marginal Processing Cost 
7 A number of empirical studies have found evidence that packers have at least some influence on price in their 
cattle input markets. For example, see Schroeter (1988). Again, this simply means that a typical individual 
packer perceives an upward sloping relationship between the number of spot market cattle procured, in any 
given time period, and the average acquisition cost of these cattle. We do not suggest that this influence on 
price is attributable, in any sense, to the use of captive supply procurement methods. 
8 The model’s conclusions require that AACs and MACs slope upward, and at least one of the following: MR 
slopes downward or MPC slopes upward at the equilibrium point. 
9 Our model’s assumption of a sunk cost of captive supply cattle raises one detail that requires further attention. 
In the case of formula-priced, marketing agreement cattle, the price to be paid for cattle delivered next week 
depends on a base price, which in turn, is derived from spot market prices this week. In some cases, the for-
mula’s base price is derived from a USDA reported market price, leaving little or no opportunity for an indi-
vidual packer to manipulate the formula base. In other cases, however, the base price is tied to the prices of the 
packer’s own spot market purchases. This raises the possibility that a packer, when expecting delivery of un-
usually large numbers of marketing agreement cattle, might pay low quality-adjusted prices on the spot mar-
ket so as to reduce the formula base and, therefore, the cost of the upcoming marketing agreement deliveries. 
To investigate this possibility empirically, one must distinguish between the two kinds of pricing formulas: 
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and is given by the vertical sum of MPC and MACS beyond that point. Figure 4 shows 
two such marginal cost curves, MC1 and MC2, corresponding to precommitted captive 
supply volumes CS1 and CS2, respectively. In either case, the packer will purchase spot 
market cattle in numbers sufficient to bring total slaughter volume to the profit maximiz-
ing point at which MC = MR. With precommitted supply volume CS1, profits are maxi-
mized with total slaughter of TS1 achieved with spot market purchases of TS1 - CS1. Al-
ternatively, suppose that the packer entered the decision period with the larger volume of 
precommitted supplies, CS2, while the position of its residual spot market supply remains 
unchanged. Then optimal total slaughter would be TS2, achieved with spot market pur-
chases of TS2 - CS2. Because TS2 - CS2 is less than TS1 - CS1, and because the packer’s resid-
ual supply is upward sloping, the packer will pay a lower average price for spot market 
cattle with precommitted deliveries CS2 than with CS1: for a given packer, facing a given 
residual supply curve of spot market cattle, higher volumes of precommitted captive supply 
deliveries will tend to be associated with lower prices paid on the spot market.
Notice the qualification emphasized with italics in the last sentence. Its importance can 
be seen by considering two simple examples. Suppose, on the one hand, that the sched-
uled captive supply deliveries of all packers in the region were to increase by the same 
factor, say 20%, from 1 week to the next. The resulting drain on the number of cattle that 
would otherwise be available on the spot market would shift back the residual supply 
curves facing each packer. Thus, while each packer may well purchase fewer spot mar-
ket cattle as a result of its increase in anticipated delivery numbers from captive supply 
sources, it is not obvious that they would be able to make those purchases at lower prices 
on average. Now, on the other hand, suppose that a given packer anticipates a 20% in-
crease in captive supply deliveries over last week’s figures and that this increase will be 
offset by a reduction in the scheduled captive supply deliveries to other packers in the re-
gional market. In this case, one would expect little or no shift in the residual supply curve 
facing the packer anticipating increased captive supply deliveries. The analysis of the pre-
vious paragraph would apply, and the packer with an increase in the scheduled volume 
Figure 3. Average and Marginal Revenue 
those with base prices tied to USDA market reports and those with base prices derived from the packer’s own 
spot market prices. We undertook this kind of investigation in Section IX of Schroeter and Azzam (1999) and 
found no evidence that packers try to manipulate formula base prices in this way. 
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of captive supply deliveries would purchase fewer spot market cattle at lower average 
prices than the previous week. 
Consideration of the two scenarios described above suggests that prices paid on the 
spot market are actually a function of the packer’s scheduled captive supply delivery vol-
ume relative to rival packers’ scheduled noncash delivery volumes. It is when a packer antici-
pates deliveries of captive supply cattle that are high relative to its rivals’ degrees of re-
liance on captive supply sources for the same period that we might expect the packer to 
make spot market purchases at low prices. Moreover, “low prices,” in this context, is also 
a relative concept. In any given week in any given regional spot market, there is, in fact, 
an entire distribution of prices paid for fed cattle; a distribution that shifts, from week to 
week, due to changes in market conditions. By a “low” price, we mean a price that is low 
relative to the mean of the price distribution representative of current market activity. 
These observations lead to the following hypothesis: 
Packers tend to pay spot market cattle prices that are low compared to the regional market’s 
average price when they anticipate near-term future deliveries of cattle from captive supply 
sources that are high, as a proportion of total slaughter volume, relative to rival packers’ de-
grees of reliance on captive supply sources over the same period. 
4. Empirical Model and Testing
We will undertake an investigation of this hypothesized relationship between spot 
market prices paid and packers’ scheduled captive supply delivery volumes using a mul-
tiple regression analysis of a data set with observations corresponding to individual lots 
purchased on the spot market. The dependent variable, RPRICE, is the “relative price” 
paid for the lot, defined as the price of the lot’s cattle; on an FOB feedyard, live weight 
basis, minus the weighted average price of steers reported by AMS for the Oklahoma–
Texas panhandle region on the day of purchase of the lot, in $/cwt. Defined in this way, 
RPRICE can be interpreted as the lot’s price’s departure from a representative average 
price for the day of purchase. 
Figure 4. Profit Maximization 
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The key explanatory variable will capture the effect on relative spot market prices of 
changes in the relative volume of scheduled deliveries of fed cattle from captive supply 
sources. To understand how this variable should be properly measured, some timing con-
siderations must first be addressed. Again, when a packer purchases cattle on the spot 
market “today,” it is with the intention of slaughtering those cattle over some future pe-
riod, or “planning horizon.”So, as argued using the graphical model of the previous sec-
tion, spot prices paid today should be connected to the packer’s relative degree of reliance 
on captive supplies over the planning horizon. Of course, there is no obviously correct 
choice for the beginning and ending dates of the planning horizon relevant to today’s 
spot market pricing conduct for a given packer. Our approach to the problem is to define 
the planning horizon for a given packer and a given spot market purchase day in terms of 
the actual disposition of the spot cattle purchased on that day. In particular, we take the 
starting and ending dates of the planning horizon to be, respectively, the earliest kill date 
and the latest kill date for the lots of spot market cattle purchased by the plant today. For 
the four plants combined, the earliest kill date and the latest kill date for a day’s spot mar-
ket cattle purchases averaged 4.5 and 10.7 days after the purchase day, respectively. 
The captive supply variable, which we call “relative ratio” and denote RRATIO, is 
then defined in terms of this planning horizon via the following construction: for each 
day on which spot market purchases were made, and for each packer, we first calculate 
the value of “RATIO,” the proportion of total steer and heifer slaughter, over the plan-
ning horizon, that is attributable to captive supplies. Then, for each spot market lot pur-
chased on that day, take the value of RRATIO to be the purchasing packer’s value of RA-
TIO expressed as a deviation from the average value of RATIO for the four Texas plants 
on that purchase day. For example, suppose that for a given spot market purchase day, 
the four plants’ total fed cattle slaughter volumes over their respective planning horizons 
contained the following proportions of cattle from captive supply sources: 0.30, 0.14, 0.26, 
and 0.34 for plants A, B, C, and D, respectively. Then a lot purchased by plant A on that 
day would be assigned an RRATIO value of 0.04 (= 0.30 - (0.30 + 0.14 + 0.26 + 0.34)/4).10 
With RRATIO defined in this way, a high (low) value for a given lot means that the plant 
purchasing the lot anticipates a degree of reliance on captive supplies, over the planning 
horizon, that is high (low) relative to that of its rivals. 
Besides RRATIO, additional explanatory variables were included in the regression to 
control for other sources of systematic variation in prices across plants and through time, 
and to account for the effects of a variety of lot quality indicators that may influence price. 
The definitions of these variables are provided in Table 1. In addition to the variables de-
fined in the table, the menu of explanatory variables also included three sets of dummy 
variables identifying the purchase day of the week (MON, TUE, WED, THU), the pur-
chasing plant, and the purchase week of the sample. 
The original data set recorded 24,425 spot market purchases of lots of fed cattle by the 
four Texas plants combined. Of these, 3,157 had to be deleted due to data problems.11 
10 These are hypothetical figures, for purposes of illustration only, and do not represent actual differences 
among plants. 
11 Two thousand three hundred forty-two lots were deleted because the FOB feedyard price, which is required 
to determine the value of the model’s dependent variable, was not recorded. Three lots were dropped because 
of other missing or obviously incorrect data entries. An additional 812 were deleted because the recorded en-
try for the lot’s total delivered cost (which should include transport cost) was less than or equal to the entry 
for FOB feedyard cost (which should exclude transport cost). Although this inconsistency does not necessarily 
mean that the value for FOB feedyard price (FOB feedyard cost divided by the lot’s total live weight) is in er-
ror, it at least casts some suspicion on its accuracy. 
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Eight lots were dropped because they were priced on a carcass-weight basis instead of a 
live-weight basis; an indication that there may have been something unusual about these 
lots. To be usable in the analysis, lots had to have been purchased on days for which an 
AMS report of steer prices was available. As a practical matter, this restricted the sam-
ple to lots purchased on week days. Also, because the planning horizon is forward-look-
ing, the sample does not contain information sufficient for the calculation of the value of 
RRATIO on some of the purchase days toward the end of the sample period: Lots pur-
chased during the sample’s last 2 weeks were dropped. These last two requirements led 
to the elimination of another 814 lots, bringing the usable total down to 20,446. Finally, 
the manner in which RRATIO is defined requires that attention be limited to the lots pur-
chased on days on which all four plants registered spot market purchases. The sample pe-
riod that remained after the last 2 weeks were dropped consisted of 65 weeks or 325 week 
days. The numbers of days of spot market activity averaged about 219 across the four 
plants, but there were only 148 days in the sample on which all four plants purchased on 
the spot market. Restricting attention to lots purchased on just these 148 days brings the 
sample to a final size of 17,846 observations. 
The model was estimated by ordinary least squares. Results are reported in Table 2. 
The regression’s R2 value of 0.2037 indicates that just over 20% of the variation in the 
model’s dependent variable is explainable in terms of the regressors. Although this pro-
portion may seem low, it should be borne in mind that the dependent variable is defined 
as the price of each sample lot’s cattle expressed as a departure from the region’s aver-
age cattle price for the day of purchase. Thus, a considerable portion of the variation in 
lot prices is already removed; this regression seeks to explain the residual variation. Col-
Table 1. Definitions of the Independent Variables Used in the Fed Cattle Relative Price Model 
Variable Name Definition (Units of Measurement) 
HEAD number of cattle in the lot (head). 
YIELD the lot’s total hot weight divided by total live weight (%). 
PCTPC percentage of lot graded Prime or Choice (%). 
PCTYG13 percentage of lot achieving yield grades of 1, 2, or 3 (%). 
MILES the distance the cattle were shipped to the plant (miles). 
MILES2 the square of the distance the cattle were shipped to the plant (miles2). 
HEIFER a dummy variable equal to 1 if the lot consists of heifers, and equal to 0 
 otherwise. 
MIXED a dummy variable equal to 1 if the lot consists of a mixture of steers and heifers
 and equal to 0 otherwise. 
AWS the lot’s average carcass weight, if the lot consists of steers; equal to 0 otherwise
 (lb.). 
AW2S the square of the lot’s average carcass weight, if the lot consists of steers; equal to
 0 otherwise (lb.2). 
AWH the lot’s average carcass weight, if the lot consists of heifers; equal to 0 otherwise
 (lb.). 
AW2H the square of the lot’s average carcass weight, if the lot consists of heifers; equal
 to 0 otherwise (lb.2). 
AWM the lot’s average carcass weight, if the lot consists of a mixture of steers and
 heifers; equal to 0 otherwise (lb.). 
AW2M the square of the lot’s average carcass weight, if the lot consists of a mixture of
 steers and heifers; equal to 0 otherwise (lb.2). 
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lectively, the explanatory variables contribute significantly to the explanation of the varia-
tion in the dependent variable: The F-value of 55.40 enables a rejection, at a marginal sig-
nificance level that is virtually zero, of the hypothesis that all parameters (other than the 
intercept term) are zero. 
We undertook tests of the joint significance of certain sets of explanatory variables. 
Our approach of expressing the dependent variable as a deviation from the AMS re-
ported average steer price for the purchase day is one way to control for variation in 
broad market price influences. With this method of control built into the model, it is nat-
ural to ask whether the purchase week dummy variables (whose coefficient estimates are 
not reported in Table 2) contribute any additional explanatory power. In fact, about 40% 
of the purchase week dummy coefficients were individually significant at the 5% level, 
with values ranging from -$0.36/cwt. to +$0.57/cwt., and the hypothesis that all purchase 
week dummies can be excluded is rejected with a marginal significance level of well be-
low 0.01%. When the model was estimated without the purchase week dummies, the R2 
Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Fed Cattle Relative Price Model. 
(Dependent Variable = RPRICE) a
Parameter Standard t-Statistic for H0: 
Independent Variables b Estimate Error Parameter = 0 
INTERCEPT -24.042 1.189 -20.23 
RRATIO -0.2122 0.0633 -3.35 
HEAD 0.00033 0.000038 8.59 
YIELD 0.12192 0.00509 23.94 
PCTPC 0.00018 0.00031 0.58 
PCTYG13 0.01739 0.00096 18.05 
MILES -0.00085 0.00017 -4.98 
MILES2 -0.0000049 0.00000048 -10.32 
HEIFER -9.0546 1.7969 -5.04 
MIXED 3.7906 3.8071 1.00 
AWS 0.03892 0.00302 12.88 
AW2S -0.000026 0.000002 -12.96 
AWH 0.07158 0.00401 17.85
AW2H -0.000054 0.000003 -18.87 
AWM 0.03047 0.01001 3.04 
AW2M -0.000022 0.000007 -3.18 
MON 0.00596 0.03797 0.16 
TUE 0.00672 0.02867 0.23 
WED -0.03743 0.02690 -1.39 
THU -0.03611 0.02808 -1.29 
R2 = 0.2037; R2 = 0.2000. Number of observations = 17,846; F-value = 55.40. 
a The dependent variable, RPRICE, is the price of cattle in the lot, FOB feedyard, on a live weight basis, minus 
the weighted average steer price, as reported by AMS, for the day of purchase of the lot, in $/cwt. 
b The key independent variable is RRATIO+ For a given lot, RRATIO is defined as the captive supply proportion 
of the purchasing plant’s steer and heifer slaughter over the planning horizon, expressed as a deviation from 
the four plants’ current average of these proportions. Most of the other independent variables are defined in 
Table 1. In addition to the variables in Table 1, the model includes a set of dummy variables for the purchase-
day-of-the-week (MON, TUE, WED, and THU), dummy variables identifying three of the four plants in the 
sample, and a set of purchase week dummy variables for 60 of the 61 weeks represented in the sample. Esti-
mates of the coefficients of the purchase week dummy variables are omitted to save space. Estimates of the 
plant dummy coefficients are withheld because of disclosure restrictions. 
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was reduced to 0.1868,but there was very little impact on the estimates of the coefficients 
of the other variables. 
Another set of explanatory variables (YIELD, PCTPC, PCTYG13, HEIFER, MIXED, 
AWS, AW2S, AWH, AW2H, AWM, and AW2M) summarizes the quality of cattle in the 
lot. Estimation of the model with these variables omitted reduces R2 drastically to 0.1000; 
their exclusion can be rejected with a marginal significance level that is essentially zero. 
The individual estimates of the coefficients of these quality variables were generally con-
sistent with expectations based on intuition and secondary information. Although this 
provides an important validation of the model’s performance, we choose, for the sake of 
brevity, to relegate a detailed discussion of these results to the Appendix. 
Primary interest focuses on the results with respect to the variable RRATIO. The null hy-
pothesis that the coefficient of RRATIO is zero can be rejected in favor of the one-sided al-
ternative that it is negative at the 0.1% significance level. This finding is statistical evidence 
in support of our hypothesis: When packers anticipate near-term future deliveries of captive 
supply cattle that are large relative to total fed cattle slaughter volume, and relative to their 
rivals’ degrees of reliance on captive supplies for the same period, they tend to pay spot 
market prices that are low relative to the market’s current average price. We can base an es-
timate of the magnitude of the effect on the parameter estimate reported in Table 2. Over 
the entire sample period, the proportion of the four plants’ combined fed cattle slaughter 
that was attributable to captive supplies was approximately 0.29. Imagine that, from 1 week 
to the next, a plant experiences an increase in its near-term future captive supply proportion 
from 0.29 to 0.39 while, at the same time, there are offsetting changes in the use of captive 
supplies by the other plants. In this case, the plant’s value of RRATIO would increase by 
0.1. The parameter estimates suggest that the effects of this change would be a decrease, rel-
ative to the market’s average price, of 0.021 $/cwt in the quality-adjusted spot prices paid 
by the plant. This figure compares to the sample-wide average spot price of 64.56 $/cwt. 
Thus, the effect, though highly statistically significant, is quite small in magnitude.12 
5. Interpretation of Results 
To interpret the results of the empirical analysis in the previous section, one must first 
distinguish between “price discovery” and “price determination.” Following Ward and 
Schroeder (1997): 
Price determination is the interaction of the broad forces of supply and demand which deter-
mine the market price level…Price discovery is the process of buyers and sellers arriving at a 
transaction price for a given quality and quantity of a product at a given time and place,…
(and) begins with the market price level. Because buyers and sellers discover prices on the ba-
sis of uncertain expectations, transaction prices fluctuate around that market price level. 
12 We believe that our method for defining the planning horizon underlying the definition of RRATIO is a rea-
sonable approach, but it is not the only approach. As a check on the robustness of our results, we replicated 
the analysis with RRATIO defined in terms of two alternative planning horizons relevant to today’s spot mar-
ket purchases: the period of 7 days following today and the period of 14 days following today. In each of these 
alternative specifications, results for the coefficient of RRATIO were qualitatively similar to those reported 
in Table 2.The point estimates were -0.4115 and -0.2182,for the 7-day and 14-day horizons, respectively, with 
marginal significance levels (for one-tailed tests) of less than 0.5% in each case. Results for the coefficients of 
the other explanatory variables were also very similar to those reported in Table 2. 
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Consistent with this view, the price of fed cattle in any one regional market at any 
given date is characterized, not by a single point value, but by a distribution of values. 
The general location of the distribution, represented by its mean, is determined, in Ward 
and Schroeder’s words, “by the broad forces of supply and demand.” But transaction 
prices on individual lots of cattle can depart from the regional average price for a variety 
of reasons. 
First of all, individual lots of cattle can be priced above or below the market average 
price because of better or worse than average lot quality. This, of course, was the moti-
vation for including several lot quality indicators among the explanatory variables in the 
price regression. Also, as is discussed in the appendix, the estimation results for the co-
efficients of these quality indicators are generally consistent with the common-sense ex-
pectations that higher than average quality lots are rewarded with a premium and lower 
than average quality lots suffer a discount, relative to the regional average price. 
Transaction prices may differ, however, even across lots of cattle of given quality. On 
any given market day, competitive conditions may vary within the regional market. A 
feedyard in one part of the region may be visited by only one bidder and, consequently, 
receive relatively low bids. For feedyards, in other parts of the region, competition among 
two or three bidders may be the norm for that day, and bids may be higher as a result. 
A packer enters the spot market intending to procure fed cattle for slaughter for a 
given planning horizon. The volume of deliveries of cattle from captive supply sources 
that the packer will receive over that horizon is known in advance. As the graphical 
model of Section 3 shows, a packer who enters the spot market expecting a relatively large 
volume of captive supply cattle to be delivered during the planning horizon, will seek to 
supplement these precommitted supplies with relatively few spot market purchases. As 
long as the packer possesses some degree of influence over price in the spot market (that 
is; as long as the packer faces a spot market residual supply curve that is upward slop-
ing), buying fewer spot market cattle will mean paying lower spot market prices, on aver-
age. On the other hand, a packer who enters the spot market expecting relatively few de-
liveries from captive supply sources in the near-term future, will seek to make relatively 
many spot market purchases. To do so, more aggressive bidding will be needed and aver-
age transaction prices will be correspondingly higher. 
Consequently, one would expect that packers who enter the spot market with a “high” 
value of Section 4’s RRATIO variable will, other things being equal, pay prices below the 
mean of the transaction price distribution. Packers who have a “low” value for RRATIO 
will tend to procure cattle at prices above the mean of the distribution. This is the phe-
nomenon reflected in the statistically significantly negative estimate of the coefficient of 
RRATIO. As noted, however, the magnitude of this effect appears to be relatively small. 
As we mentioned in the Introduction, there is an on-going captive supply policy 
debate fueled by the belief that the use of captive supplies leads to lower cash mar-
ket prices and, therefore, is harmful to cash market sellers. It is sometimes suggested 
that packers’ use of captive supplies is a strategy specifically designed to depress cash 
prices. We emphasize that we do not interpret our results as lending support to either 
of those views. Proper interpretation of the coefficient of RRATIO requires attention to 
details of model specification. Recall that our menu of explanatory variables includes 
plant-specific dummy variables. Because of this, the coefficient of RRATIO reflects only 
the effects of short-term fluctuations in the relative captive supply proportion about 
plant-specific average values, rather than any effects of systematic differences in these 
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average values.13 Within our final sample of 148 days of spot market activity, each of 
the four plants exhibited both positive and negative values for RRATIO; that is, each 
operated under conditions of both higher than average and lower than average cap-
tive supply delivery commitments. But the overall sample average captive supply pro-
portions of total slaughter differed significantly across the four plants. Any price ef-
fects attributable to these differences are not reflected in the coefficient of RRATIO but, 
instead, contribute to differences in the plant-specific intercept terms. To that extent, 
however, they are confounded with the effects of all other not-otherwise-accounted-for 
plant-specific characteristics. 
It is also clear that the coefficient of RRATIO is not indicative of any impact on cash 
prices of an across-the-board change in plants’ propensities to use captive supplies. This 
is easily seen by noting that RRATIO measures a packer’s degree of reliance on captive 
supplies relative to its rivals’ degrees of reliance on captive supplies: An across-the-board 
change in the average level of noncash purchases would leave RRATIO unaffected. 
Thus, the relevance of the RRATIO coefficient is limited to the relative price effects of 
short-run departures from the mean of a plant’s relative degree of captive supply reliance. 
The final point to be made in this connection is that the plant’s control over this short-run 
variation in RRATIO might be quite limited. First of all, a given plant’s RRATIO value for 
a given day is defined relative to its rivals’ current use of captive supplies and therefore 
depends, in part, on its rivals’ cattle procurement practices.14 More importantly, for the 
case of cattle sold via marketing agreements, the noncash procurement method account-
ing for 73% of captive supply volume in our sample, delivery scheduling appears to be 
the prerogative of the feeder, not the packer.15 
6. Summary 
Several empirical studies in the agricultural economics literature have uncovered in-
verse relationships, of one sort or another, between captive supply use and spot prices for 
fed cattle. In our work, we began by first drawing a careful distinction between two kinds 
of captive-supply–spot-price relationships that we dubbed the “market-level” and the 
“plant-level” relationships. The present article addresses the plant-level relationship. Us-
ing an extensive data set on the cattle procurement activities of four large packing plants 
in the Texas Panhandle, we investigated the plant-level relationship and found that pack-
ers tend to pay spot market prices that are low compared to the regional market’s aver-
age price when they anticipate near-term future deliveries of cattle from captive supply 
sources that are high relative to total slaughter volume and relative to rival packers’ de-
grees of reliance on captive supply sources over the same period. The effect is statistically 
significant but relatively small in magnitude. 
We argue, moreover, that this finding does not indict captive supply procurement 
methods as the culprit responsible for “low” cash market prices, and should not be used 
13 In the implementation of the estimation procedure, the values of RRATIO were, in fact, normalized by sub-
tracting the corresponding plants’ sample average values of RRATIO. This normalization affects only the esti-
mates of the plant-specific intercept terms, not the estimate of the coefficient of the RRATIO variable. 
14 For each of the four plants, the values for RRATIO and for RATIO (the plant’s own proportion of captive sup-
ply cattle over the planning horizon) were positively correlated, however. 
15 Evidence supporting this claim is presented in Appendix B of Schroeter and Azzam (1999). 
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as a justification for policies that restrict the use of captive supplies. Even if there were 
no  cattle procured via captive supply methods, there would still be a distribution of spot 
market transaction prices with, at any given point in time, some packers paying above av-
erage prices and some paying below average prices. Our regression results have implica-
tions only about the identities of packers who happen to buy at low-end prices and those 
who buy at high-end prices: Other things equal, packers that currently have a high rela-
tive degree of reliance on captive supplies tend to pay slightly lower than average prices 
while packers that currently have a low relative degree of reliance on captive supply pro-
curement methods tend to pay slightly higher than average prices. 
7. Appendix. Discussion of the Results of Estimation of the  
Relative Price Model 
This appendix discusses the estimates of the coefficients of the model’s explanatory 
variables other than RRATIO. The estimate of the coefficient of HEAD is significantly pos-
itive. Other things equal, packers pay higher prices for spot market cattle sold in larger 
lots; perhaps because the purchase of a few large lots reduces transactions costs relative 
to the alternative of buying numerous small lots. The effect is relatively small, however. 
Average lot size in the sample was 190 head with a standard deviation of 127 head. The 
coefficient estimate predicts that an increase in lot size by one sample standard deviation 
would increase the price of cattle by about $0.04/cwt. 
The estimate of the YIELD coefficient is significantly positive. The implication of the re-
gression result is that higher yielding cattle are paid higher live-weight prices, but lower 
prices on a $/cwt. carcass basis. The sample’s average value of YIELD is about 63.79%. A lot 
of cattle yielding 1 percentage point higher than average (roughly the standard deviation of 
the sample’s distribution of YIELD values) would receive a price $0.12/cwt. higher than av-
erage on a live-weight basis, but $1.37/cwt. lower than average on a carcass-weight basis. 
The estimate of the coefficient of PCTPC was positive but very small and statistically 
insignificant. This is a surprising result, especially in view of the fact that the Choice-Se-
lect spread in boxed beef cutout values does not appear to have been unusually low dur-
ing the period of analysis. Some experimentation revealed that the findings with regard 
to the price effects of PCTPC are very sensitive to the definition of the dependent variable 
(e.g., live-weight basis vs. carcass-weight basis) and the sample used. 
The estimate of the coefficient of the percentage of the lot achieving yield grades 1, 
2, or 3 is significantly positive. The value of the point estimate implies that a one sample 
standard deviation increase in PCTYG13 (about 6 percentage points) is rewarded with an 
additional $0.10/cwt. 
The average distance cattle were shipped to the plant was 60 miles with a standard de-
viation of 61 miles. The estimates of the coefficients of MILES and MILES2 combine to im-
ply that a lot of cattle shipped a distance that is one standard deviation greater than the 
mean distance would, other things equal, be paid about $0.11/cwt. less than a lot shipped 
the mean distance. 
Dummy variables identifying lots of heifers and mixed lots (including steers and heif-
ers) were included to allow for the possibility that such lots might receive a price that is 
discounted relative to the price paid for steers. The estimates of the coefficients of these 
dummy variables are difficult to interpret in isolation, however. The estimate of the coef-
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ficient of HEIFER, -9.05, when taken at face value, implies that a lot of heifers would suf-
fer a very large price discount of nearly $9.05/cwt. relative to a lot of steers, other things 
equal. This comparison is not particularly meaningful, however, because other things, no-
tably average carcass weight, typically are not equal for steers and heifers. 
Because ideal carcass weight differs with the sex of cattle, the variables average car-
cass weight and the square of the average carcass weight were included separately for 
lots of steers, of heifers, and of steers and heifers mixed. Estimates imply that the highest 
valued carcass weights were 750.2 lb., 660.7 lb., and 696.9 lb. for steer lots, heifer lots, and 
mixed steer and heifer lots, respectively, with, in each case, drop-offs in value for heavier 
and lighter carcasses. This appears to be roughly consistent with packer preferences as re-
flected in many marketing agreement pricing formulas. For example, one particular for-
mula, of which we are aware, uses a base carcass characterized, in part, by the weight 
range 550–945 lbs., with discounts applied to both heavier and lighter carcasses. 
The estimates of the coefficients of the three plant dummy variables include the effects 
of any not otherwise accounted for plant-specific factors including the plants’ different 
average propensities to employ captive supply procurement methods. There were signif-
icant differences in these figures across plants, but disclosure restrictions prevent release 
of individual plant estimates. 
The estimates of the coefficients of the purchase-day-of-the-week dummy vari-
ables ranged in absolute value from less than $0.01/cwt. to about $0.04/cwt., but none 
achieved statistical significance at conventional levels. Controlling for the other factors 
represented in the regression equation, there appear to be no significant differences in 
prices paid across days of the week. 
Finally, the regression equation also included a set of purchase week dummy vari-
ables for 60 of 61 of the weeks represented in the sample. The estimates (not reported in 
Table 2) of the coefficients of these variables ranged in magnitude from -$0.36/cwt. to 
+$0.57/cwt., with about 40% achieving statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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